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In 2009 the Payments Council, on behalf of the 
UK banks, proposed that the cheque clearing
system should be abolished in 2018, provided
that some satisfactory replacement could be
found. In 2011, under pressure from the Treasury
Select Committee and the government, the
Payments Council abandoned its proposal, and
undertook instead to concentrate on improving
the processing of cheques behind the scenes.
Until then, the Payments Council had been
working on a paper-based replacement for
cheques. This paper looks at how digital
signatures might be used with a paper payment
instrument to simplify the clearing system and
make other improvements.
Payments are increasingly being made by credit and
debit card, or by direct bank-to-bank payment initiated
by the customer by telephone or through on-line
banking.  But there remain a number of cases where
these methods are unsatisfactory either to the payer or
to the recipient. Not all bank customers are willing to
use credit or debit cards (and cases continue to arise
where a bank refuses to reimburse a customer who
claims to have been the victim of fraudulent withdrawal
of funds through the use of a card). Similarly, not all
customers are able or willing to use telephone or
internet banking; nor are these methods a satisfactory
way to pay – for example, a plumber who expects
payment on completion of a call-out in an amount for
which the customer cannot be expected to keep enough
cash available. And not all small traders, clubs or
charities can accept payments by card.
The drawbacks of cheques should nevertheless be
acknowledged. Their use in their present form requires
a clearing system, under which the recipients send the
cheques they receive to their banks, who present them
through the clearing system to the issuers’ banks for
payment. The issuers’ banks must decide for each
cheque whether it is genuine, and whether funds or
credit are available to enable it to be honoured. This
costs money and takes time; and until an uncertain time
has passed, the recipient of a cheque cannot know that
the cheque has been met on presentation. And if a
cheque is sent by post and stolen, the thief may be able
to open a new account in the recipient’s name (using
forged credentials), obtain payment and disappear
before the cheque can be stopped. In such a case the
true owner can only recover the loss from the bank who
opened the account for the thief if the bank acted
carelessly or dishonestly; and among the by-products of
the digital age has been the ease with which convincing
credentials can be forged, so that even a careful bank
can be deceived.
Cheques have their virtues too. Perhaps the first is
convenience to the payer: cheques can be written at the
moment of purchase for any amount, and handed or
posted to the recipient. Payers by cheque also have
valuable legal protection from fraud: if a bank pays the
value of a cheque which has been forged, however
careful the bank has been, it must reimburse the
customer and stand the loss itself – and the burden of
proving that a cheque was genuine falls on the bank.
Recipients also get some benefit from taking a cheque:
once a cheque has been given, it can be enforced
through the courts, and the payer cannot dispute the
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the benefit of
comments on a draft of the paper from Ross
Anderson and Brian Gladman.
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debt for which it was given. And finally, customers can
obtain from their bank a cheque drawn by the bank in
favour of the recipient. Such a cheque, usually called a
banker’s draft, commits the bank to payment, and so is
more or less as good as cash (but much more
convenient than cash if the amount is large).
This paper suggests how the present system of
cheques might be adapted to dispense with the use of a
clearing system while achieving many of its advantages
and removing at least one of its drawbacks. But the
problem of paying the plumber seems insoluble for
those unable or unwilling to use the internet, leaving
cash as the only method.
In short, it is argued that the banks should provide
their customers with crossed cheques issued by the
banks in favour of named recipients. To improve
security, the name of the recipient and the account
number of the recipient’s bank account should be
included in the cheque. To improve acceptability, the
cheques should include a digital signature by the
issuing bank, and the banks should make widely
available a verification device which would read the
cheque, and confirm its genuineness, or some other
procedure to achieve the same result.
For marketing reasons the banks might wish to give
these cheques a new name, for example calling them
“warrants”, to distinguish the new system from the old.
But it would be important to ensure that the cheques
were understood (and acknowledged by the banks) to
be cheques within the meaning of the legislation
currently governing cheques and other bills of
exchange. This would ensure that there were no doubts
about the legal effects of the new cheques, as it would
make it clear that the current well-developed system of
law continued to apply. Because some features of these
cheques would require the support of primary
legislation, the opportunity could usefully be taken to
remove any doubt that such cheques were subject to
the existing cheque legislation.
Customers could obtain the new cheques over the
counter or by post, authorising their issue by signing a
paper form, or by newer methods like telephone or
internet banking. But because the cheques would bear
a digital signature, they could also be sent over the
internet for local printing by customers able and willing
to use this method. This would enable a customer to
produce a cheque almost immediately when required.
Because the cheques would be electronic in form, they
could be sent by e-mail to the recipient if preferred, and
likewise sent by e-mail by the recipient to his bank for
collection. A request for the issue of such a cheque
could, by arrangement with the issuing bank, be made
to require more than one signatory, thus preserving the
existing precautions taken by a number of bodies,
including especially charities.
Because the banks would issue the new cheques, and
their genuineness could be verified easily by anyone,
they would not need to be supported by a clearing
system – they would in effect be pre-cleared. Recipients
would have the issuing bank’s guarantee of payment,
and should be given immediate value by their own
bank. The cheques would be designed to be machine-
readable, thus facilitating interbank accounting.
The inclusion of the recipient’s bank account number
would be an important safeguard against fraud if a
cheque were stolen. In order to obtain value for a stolen
cheque, the thief would have to open a bank account in
the name of the recipient, as now; but the account
would have to have the same number as the one shown
on the stolen cheque. This is not remotely likely to
happen by chance, and a request for an account to bear
a specific number would be highly suspicious. Moreover
the bank might well be unable to comply with it even if
it were willing to do so (since banking systems are
unlikely to be designed to enable account numbers to
be chosen at will). To back up this important protection,
legislation would be required to provide that a bank
which paid a stolen cheque into an account with a
number different from the one shown on the cheque
should be liable to compensate the true owner for the
loss. (This is very similar to the existing rule under
which a bank is liable if it pays over the counter the
value of a stolen crossed cheque, since banks are
required to pay crossed cheques into bank accounts.)
Recipients of payments would be required to disclose
their bank account numbers to payers. Anxiety is
sometimes expressed about the risks of such a
disclosure. The anxiety is misplaced. Knowledge of a
bank account number, even with knowledge of the sort
code which identifies the branch at which the account is
held, is not enough to enable funds to be withdrawn
from the account. Account numbers and sort codes are
of course already shown on printed cheque forms, and
thus disclosed to recipients of cheque payments, and
this has been the case without apparent public anxiety
for very many years. (It is true that participants in the
direct debit scheme can originate such debits using only
the sort code and account number. But participants are
admitted to the scheme by the banks only if the banks
trust the participant; and the banks guarantee
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The banks could collaborate to make verification
devices that could verify cheques issued by any
participating bank, avoiding the need for a multiplicity
of devices. Such devices should be made widely
available free or at very low cost, since it is in the
interests of the banks to have their signatures readily
verifiable. In principle mobile telephones could be used
as verification devices, since many have both the
necessary camera and processing power. But mobile
telephones, like other computers, are susceptible to
infection by malicious software, which could cause a
telephone to verify a bogus cheque as genuine. To
exploit this possibility, a payer would have to be able to
modify a cheque suitably and also to target the
recipient’s telephone with the necessary malicious
software to verify the cheque as genuine. This may in
practice be too difficult for criminals to find worthwhile;
but recipients of payments, who would suffer the loss,
would not usually have the technical skills to protect
themselves from the risk or to evaluate it. Another
alternative method of verification, for users of the
internet, would be for the banks to provide a web site
which, on entry of a code taken from the cheque, would
display the details of the genuine cheque corresponding
to that code. Cheques received in electronic form could
be verified by the use of software running on the
computer where they were received.
A payer could make multiple copies of a cheque. With
this possibility in mind, cheques would bear a unique
serial number, and the issuing bank would pay against
only one instance of a given cheque. The recipient
would not be prejudiced by this, since all the copies
would be payable to the same recipient through the
same bank account, and the recipient ought not to be
expecting payment more than once on the same cheque
in any event. Recipients of a series of payments of the
same amount, whether on the same or on different
dates, would have to take care to check that different
serial numbers appeared on what purported to be
different cheques. The banks would need to keep a
database of presented cheques, to guard against
presentation of multiple copies. The check against the
database could be seen as a form of clearing, but it
would be very significantly cheaper than the existing
clearing system, since it would require no judgement
about the genuineness of handwritten signatures or the
availability of funds, and could be performed
automatically and within seconds of the cheque being
received by the collecting bank. The web site suggested
above would also enable recipients of cheques to make
sure that they were receiving a new cheque for a
recurring payment, and not the repeat of one already
paid.
Cheques could provide for a future value date, thus
enabling credit to be obtained by the payer and security
by the recipient. Whether the issuing bank would delay
the debit to its customer’s account until the value date
would depend on the customer’s arrangements with its
bank, however.
A cheque would not be paid until presented for
payment by the recipient through his own bank. If the
customer changed his mind about a transaction before
handing over the cheque issued for it, he would want to
cancel the cheque and have any debit to his account
reversed. But the bank would be liable on the cheque if
presented, and because the cheque could exist in
multiple copies, it could not effectively be returned to
the bank for cancellation.
The answer to this problem, a new problem arising
from the digital nature of the cheque, would be to give
the cheques a fairly short standard period of validity
(with their expiry date being shown plainly on their
face), after which the liability of the issuing bank would
be discharged and the debit to the customer reversed
automatically. The customer should be free to specify
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the expiry date when requesting the cheque, since it
would be the customer’s funds which would be
unavailable until that date. Unless the customer
specified a date, there could be a default date of, say,
seven days after the date of issue. A short validity
period would no doubt mean that some recipients failed
to present their cheques in time. But it should be cheap
to replace an expired cheque with a new one. The cost
to the bank of issuing such a cheque is basically the
same as the cost of making an on-line payment (or a
little more if it is sent by post or issued over the
counter), and the charge should be very low.
If the short validity period were considered a serious
drawback, an alternative approach would permit simple
cancellation of a new cheque before presentation for
payment, much as a paper cheque can be stopped. The
consequence would be that the new cheques would not
guarantee payment to the recipient. If stopped before
presentation, the recipient would be left to enforce
payment against the customer by legal proceedings if
necessary, as is the case with a stopped paper cheque.
This result would be achieved by providing for the
new cheque to be digitally signed by the issuing bank
as agent for a customer named in the cheque. Where a
document is signed by an agent of a named principal, it
is the principal and not the agent who is liable on it. No
funds would be debited on the issue of such a cheque
by the bank, but only on its presentation for payment by
the recipient’s bank. The bank would make its decision
whether funds or credit were available at the time of
presentation instead of when asked to issue the
cheque. Cheques would therefore need to be cleared
electronically on presentation, but clearing would be
greatly simplified by the fact that genuineness would be
checked automatically.
The only serious drawback of banks signing cheques
as agents, without being liable on them, would be the
risk that the public would find the cheques misleading.
They would be signed by a bank, and the banks’ denial
of liability on them, on the basis that they were acting
only as agents, might seem tricky and evasive.
Whichever model were adopted, the new cheques
would provide a highly flexible transition for an old and
valued method of payment into the new digital world.
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